David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 (62):177-196 (2008)
in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.) Being: Developments in Contemporary Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peter van Inwagen claims that there are no tables or chairs. He also claims that sentences such as ‘There are chairs here’, which seem to imply their existence, are often true. This combination of views opens van Inwagen to a charge of self-contradiction. I explain the charge, and van Inwagen’s response to it, which involves the claim that sentences like ‘There are tables’ shift their truth-conditions between different contexts of utterance. I present an alternative response which involves the negation of that claim, and argue that it is preferable to van Inwagen’s.
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References found in this work BETA
Stuart Brock (1993). Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen. Mind 102 (405):147-150.
John P. Burgess & Gideon A. Rosen (1997). A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1947/1956). Meaning and Necessity. University of Chicago Press.
John Divers & Jason Hagen (2006). The Modal Fictionalist Predicament. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press. 57.
Citations of this work BETA
Sam Cowling (2013). Ideological Parsimony. Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
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