The autism objection to pretence theories
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):764-782 (2010)
| Abstract | A pretence theory of a discourse is one which claims that we do not believe or assert the propositions expressed by the sentences we utter when taking part in the discourse: instead, we are speaking from within a pretence. Jason Stanley argues that if a pretence account of a discourse is correct, people with autism should be incapable of successful participation in it; but since people with autism are capable of participiating successfully in the discourses which pretence theorists aim to account for, all these accounts should be rejected. I discuss how pretence theorists can respond, and apply this discussion to two pretence theories, Stephen Yablo's account of arithmetic and Kendall Walton's account of negative existentials. I show how Yablo and Walton can escape Stanley's objection | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJuan-carlos Gómez (2008). The Evolution of Pretence: From Intentional Availability to Intentional Non-Existence. Mind and Language 23 (5):586-606.
Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) (2004). Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence. Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini (2010). How Pretence Can Really Be Metarepresentational. Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
Peter Carruthers (2002). Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, its Evolution, and its Connections with Childhood Pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):225-249.
Kenneth M. Prkachin (2002). Pain Behavior and the Pretence of Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (4):470-470.
Sarah Sawyer (2002). Abstract Artifacts in Pretence. Philosophical Papers 31 (2):183-198.
Somogy Varga (2011). Pretence, Social Cognition and Self-Knowledge in Autism. Psychopathology 44 (1):45-52..
Nava Kahana & Tikva Lecker (2000). When Pretence Can Be Beneficial. Theory and Decision 48 (1):85-99.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-02-25Total downloads84 ( #8,907 of 549,754 )Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,270 of 549,754 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
