Logos and Episteme 3 (1):153-160 (2012)
|Abstract||In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1):31-56.
Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (forthcoming). Reasons, Facts-About-Evidence, and Indirect Evidence. Analytic Philosophy.
Simon Robertson (2008). Not so Enticing Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263 - 277.
Fred I. Dretske (1971). Reasons, Knowledge, and Probability. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):216-220.
Clayton Littlejohn (2013). No Evidence is False. Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
William Rowley (2012). Evidence of evidence and testimonial reductionism. Episteme 9 (4):377-391.
Tim Henning (2012). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2).
Mark McBride (forthcoming). Kearns and Star on Reasons as Evidence. Analytic Philosophy.
Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter (2009). Reasons as Right-Makers. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):279-296.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (forthcoming). Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology. Synthese.
Patricia Greenspan (2007). Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'. In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II.
Daniel Steel (1996). Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):666-674.
Added to index2012-03-28
Total downloads31 ( #39,249 of 548,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,799 of 548,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?