Are reasons evidence of oughts?

Logos and Episteme 3 (1):153-160 (2012)
Abstract
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to ϕ simply are evidence that one ought to ϕ, and suggest that “evidence” in this context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.
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    Similar books and articles
    Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
    Simon Robertson (2008). Not so Enticing Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):263 - 277.
    Tim Henning (2012). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):n/a-n/a.
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