Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):263-305 (2008)
|Abstract||A knowledge-how attributing sentence of the form ' S knows how to F ' may yield an 'ability-entailing' reading as well as an 'ability-neutral' reading. The present paper offers an epistemological account of the availability of both readings, based on two conceptual distinctions: first, a distinction between a 'practical' and a 'theoretical' kind of knowledge of how to do something; second, a distinction between an 'intrinsic' and an 'extrinsic' kind of ability to do something. The first part of the paper presents the double distinction that constitutes the proposed account; the second part presents a number of theoretical, mainly epistemological motivations for accepting the account.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). Implicit Definition and the Application of Logic. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):131-148.
Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How: A Unified Account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
John Greco (2007). The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
John Greco (2009). Knowledge and Success From Ability. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads73 ( #11,386 of 549,066 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,066 )
How can I increase my downloads?