Facts, ends, and normative reasons

Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17 - 26 (2010)
Abstract
This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
Keywords Normative reasons  Reasons and facts  Reasons and ends  Reasons and principles
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    References found in this work BETA
    E. J. Bond (1983). Reason and Value. Cambridge University Press.
    G. A. Cohen (2003). Facts and Principles. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):211–245.
    Jonathan Dancy & Christopher Hookway (1986). Two Conceptions of Moral Realism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60:167 - 205.

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