Moral error theory

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109 (2004)
The paper explores the consequences of adopting a moral error theory targeted at the notion of reasonable convergence. I examine the prospects of two ways of combining acceptance of such a theory with continued acceptance of moral judgements in some form. On the first model, moral judgements are accepted as a pragmatically intelligible fiction. On the second model, moral judgements are made relative to a framework of assumptions with no claim to reasonable convergence on their behalf. I argue that the latter model shows greater promise for an error theorist whose commitment to moral thought is initially serious
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DOI 10.1111/j.0309-7013.2004.00083.x
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PhilPapers Archive Hallvard Lillehammer, Moral error theory
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Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469 - 484.
Wouter F. Kalf (2015). Are Moral Properties Impossible? Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1869-1887.

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