Reproduction, partiality, and the non-identity problem
In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons (2009)
| Abstract | Much work in contemporary bioethics defends a broadly liberal view of human reproduction. I shall take this view to comprise (but not to be exhausted by) the following four claims.1 First, it is permissible both to reproduce and not to reproduce, either by traditional means or by means of assisted reproductive techniques such as IVF and genetic screening. Second, it is permissible either to reproduce or to adopt or otherwise foster an existing child to which one is not biologically related. Third, it is permissible either to bring into existence a child with the greatest chance of a life of maximum human flourishing or to bring into existence a child with a life worth living but with less than the greatest chance of a life of maximum human flourishing. Fourth, it is impermissible to bring into existence a child whose life is either certain or likely to fall below some baseline of a human life minimally worth living. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Alexander R. Cohen (2007). Truly Human Reproduction. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:305-313.
Hyunseop Kim (forthcoming). The Uncomfortable Truth About Wrongful Life Cases. Philosophical Studies.
M. L. (2001). Confused Meanings of Life, Genes and Parents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (4):647-661.
Eduardo Rivera-lópez (2009). Individual Procreative Responsibility and the Non-Identity Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):336-363.
David Archard (2004). Wrongful Life. Philosophy 79 (3):403-420.
Aaron Smuts (forthcoming). Five Tests for What Makes a Life Worth Living. Journal of Value Inquiry.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-10-03Total downloads59 ( #16,843 of 556,840 )Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,653 of 556,840 )How can I increase my downloads? |

