The Epistemology of Ethical Intuitions

Philosophy 86 (336):175-200 (2011)
Abstract
Intuitions are widely assumed to play an important evidential role in ethical inquiry. In this paper I critically discuss a recently influential claim that the epistemological credentials of ethical intuitions are undermined by their causal pedigree and functional role. I argue that this claim is exaggerated. In the course of doing so I argue that the challenge to ethical intuitions embodied in this claim should be understood not only as a narrowly epistemological challenge, but also as a substantially ethical one. I argue that this fact illuminates the epistemology of ethical intuitions
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Selim Berker (2009). The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (4):293-329.

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