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- John Linarelli (2009). Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial Law. Penn State Law Review 114 (1):119-215.Commercial lawyers working across borders know that globalization has changed commercial law. To think of commercial law as only the law of states is to have an inadequate understanding of the norms governing commercial transactions. Some have argued for a transnational conception of commercial law, but their grounds of justification have been unpersuasive, often grounded on claims about the common content among national legal systems. Legal positivism is a rich literature on the concept of a legal system and the validity conditions for rules in legal systems, but it has not been used to understand legal order outside or beyond the state. This article aims to use legal positivism to conceptualize a transnational commercial law order. Prevailing positivist accounts at least implicitly condition legal order on state sovereignty. The article offers a cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism, in which the state is no longer an enabling condition for law. The cosmopolitan conception provides the means by which to adequately describe a transnational commercial law order. There are limits to the conceptual analysis this article provides, one of which is that it does not purport to evaluate the justice or morality of transnational legal order. But the cosmopolitan conception of legal positivism elucidated in this article stands on its own as a way of understanding a number of transnational legal orders other than commercial law. The attractiveness of the account is that it describes law as a human social practice even when it is not solely the product of the state, so that we do not have to rely on natural law theories to understand legal rules that states do not maintain.Reading list | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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Law in between facts and norms -- Law in the postnational constellation -- Situating the debate between Habermas and Hart -- Establishing institutions -- The variety of legal systems -- Relations between legal systems -- The quest for normative foundations -- Conceiving general jurisprudence.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This collection of original papers from distinguished legal theorists offers a challenging assessment of the nature and viability of legal positivism, a branch of legal theory which continues to dominate contemporary legal theoretical debates. To what extent is the law adequately described as autonomous? Should law claim autonomy? These and other questions are addressed by the authors in this carefully edited collection, and it will be of interest to all lawyers and scholars interested in legal philosophy and legal theory.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... How can legal orders coexist? Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law, i.e. the law where the case happens to arise. But this analysis does not capture international law. This is, or appears to be, a distinct legal order that is certainly not the law of a distinct nation or a people but aspires to cover the whole of the world and – perhaps surprisingly – does seem to meet many of the ordinary criteria of a legal order. This review essay discusses two recent attempts at accommodating international law, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, by Yuval Shany and A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, by George Letsas. In their own ways both books outline a ‘substantive’ theory of international law, which is to be welcomed.
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| | Other links: ssrn.com | Scholar | At my library | More options ... This article deals with the relation between a theory of law and a theory of legal reasoning. Starting from a close reading of Chapter VII of H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law, it claims that a theory of law like Hart's requires a particular theory of legal reasoning, or at least a theory of legal reasoning with some particular characteristics. It then goes on to say that any theory of legal reasoning that satisfies those requirements is highly implausible, and tries to show that this is the reason why not only Hart, but also writers like Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz have failed to offer a theory of legal reasoning that is compatible with legal positivism as a theory of law. They have faced a choice between an explanation of legal reasoning that is incompatible with the core of legal positivism or else strangely sceptical, insofar as it severs the link between general rules and particular decisions that purport to apply them.
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| | Other links: ingentaconnect.com jstor.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Of all the concepts in use in the legal discourse, "legal positivism" is certainly one of the most polysemous. This is why one currently runs the risk of being misunderstood when making use of it. In particular, there is a sharp distinction between how legal theorists use the concept and how it is most often used by other legal scholars and legal practicioners. This paper attempts to succinctly present a typology of the different uses of the concept in order to facilitate more fruitful discussions. We have classified the different uses of the concept in three broad categories: (1) legal positivism as a methodological approach to the study of law; (2) legal positivism as a theory of law; and (3) legal positivism as an ideology. Each category is further subdivided so as to highlight different currents in the use of the concept within each category.
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| | Scholar | More options ... In this article, I argue that - despite the absence of any clear influence of one theory on the other - the legal theories of Dworkin and Hegel share several similar and, at times, unique positions that join them together within a distinctive school of legal theory, sharing a middle position between natural law and legal positivism. In addition, each theory can help the other in addressing certain internal difficulties. By recognizing both Hegel and Dworkin as proponents of a position lying in between natural law and legal positivist jurisprudence, we can gain clarity in why their general legal theories seem to fit uncomfortably, if indeed they can be said to fit at all, within so many different camps - while fitting comfortably in no particular camp - as well as highlight what has been overlooked.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... In the field of international commercial contracts, the move towards legal harmonization is seen mainly as a function of two vectorial forces: conventional uniform law and the lex mercatoria. In both cases, the decision-maker is frequently confronted by the silence of the law. By analysing the ways in which a decision-maker may resort to the general principles of law and trade usages to make the law speak, the author sets out the broad outlines of an attempt to help situate the sources of transnational law between law and contract on one hand, and between formal law and informal law on the other.
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| | Scholar | More options ... On normative order -- On institutional order-- Law and the constitutional state -- A problem : rules or habits? -- On persons -- Wrongs and duties -- Legal positions and relations : rights and obligations -- Legal relations and things : property -- Legal powers and validity -- Powers and public law : law and politics -- Constraints on power : fundamental rights -- Criminal law and civil society : law and morality -- Private law and civil society : law and economy -- Positive law and moral autonomy -- On law and justice -- Law and values : reflections on method.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Legitimate authority -- The claims of law -- Legal positivism and the sources of law -- Legal reasons, sources, and gaps -- The identity of legal systems -- The institutional nature of law -- Kelsen's theory of the basic norm -- Legal validity -- The functions of law -- Law and value in adjudication -- The rule of law and its virtue -- The obligation to obey the law -- Respect for law -- A right to dissent? : civil disobedience -- A right to dissent? : conscientious objection --The purity of the pure theory -- The argument from justice, or how not to reply to legal positivism.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of John Linarelli, Analytical jurisprudence and the concept of commercial law
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