Epistemological challenges to mathematical platonism

Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574 (2006)
Abstract Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism. I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly turns out to be logical space for a response to the improved challenge where no such space appeared to exist.
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