David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Human Studies 32 (2):153 - 181 (2009)
This article argues that understanding everyday practices in neurobiological labs requires us to take into account a variety of different action positions: self-conscious social actors, technical artifacts, conscious organisms, and organisms being merely alive. In order to understand the interactions among such diverse entities, highly differentiated conceptual tools are required. Drawing on the theory of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner, the paper analyzes experimenters as self-conscious social persons who recognize monkeys as conscious organisms. Integrating Plessner’s ideas into the stock of concepts used in science and technology studies provides richer descriptions of laboratory life. In particular, this theory allows an understanding of a crucial feature of neurobiological brain research: the construction of the brain as the epistemic object of brain research. As such, the brain must be isolated from the acting and interacting organism in a complicated process.
|Keywords||Actor Brain Epistemological object Human-monkey interaction Plessner Representation Second person perspective Science studies|
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References found in this work BETA
Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar (1982). Laboratory Life. The Social Construction of Scientific Facts. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 13 (1):166-170.
Bruno Latour (1994). On Technical Mediation. Common Knowledge 3 (2):29-64.
Andrea Loettgers (2007). Getting Abstract Mathematical Models in Touch with Nature. Science in Context 20 (1):97.
Walter Omar Kohan & David Knowles Kennedy (2015). Editorial. Childhood and Philosophy 11 (21):5-10.
Citations of this work BETA
Gesa Lindemann (2011). On Latour's Social Theory and Theory of Society, and His Contribution to Saving the World. Human Studies 34 (1):93-110.
Daniel Bischur (2011). Animated Bodies in Immunological Practices: Craftsmanship, Embodied Knowledge, Emotions and Attitudes Toward Animals. [REVIEW] Human Studies 34 (4):407-429.
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