In defense of the contingently nonconcrete

Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):283-294 (1996)
In "Actualism or Possibilism?" (Philosophical Studies, 84 (2-3), December 1996), James Tomberlin develops two challenges for actualism. The challenges are to account for the truth of certain sentences without appealing to merely possible objects. After canvassing the main actualist attempts to account for these phenomena, he then criticizes the new conception of actualism that we described in our paper "In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic" (Philosophical Perspectives 8: Philosophy of Logic and Language, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1994). We respond to Tomberlin's criticism by showing that we wouldn't analyze the problematic claim (e.g., "Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth") in the way he suggests.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00354491
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1963). Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

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Chad Carmichael (2015). Deep Platonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):n/a-n/a.
Karen Bennett (2006). Proxy “Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):263 - 294.

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