Metaontological Minimalism

Philosophy Compass 7 (2):139-151 (2012)
Abstract
Can there be objects that are ‘thin’ in the sense that very little is required for their existence? A number of philosophers have thought so. For instance, many Fregeans believe it suffices for the existence of directions that there be lines standing in the relation of parallelism; other philosophers believe it suffices for a mathematical theory to have a model that the theory be coherent. This article explains the appeal of thin objects, discusses the three most important strategies for articulating and defending the idea of such objects, and outlines some problems that these strategies face.
Keywords ontology  metaontology  structuralism  abstraction  Frege  existence  objects
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Benacerraf (1973). Mathematical Truth. Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.

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Øystein Linnebo (2012). Reference by Abstraction. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):45-71.
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