Naturalized platonism versus platonized naturalism
Journal of Philosophy 92 (10):525-555 (1995)
| Abstract | In this paper, we develop an alternative strategy, Platonized Naturalism, for reconciling naturalism and Platonism and to account for our knowledge of mathematical objects and properties. A systematic (Principled) Platonism based on a comprehension principle that asserts the existence of a plenitude of abstract objects is not just consistent with, but required (on transcendental grounds) for naturalism. Such a comprehension principle is synthetic, and it is known a priori. Its synthetic a priori character is grounded in the fact that it is an essential part of the logic in which any scientific theory will be formulated and so underlies (our understanding of) the meaningfulness of any such theory (this is why it is required for naturalism). Moreover, the comprehension principle satisfies naturalist standards of reference, knowledge, and ontological parsimony! As part of our argument, we identify mathematical objects as abstract individuals in the domain governed by the comprehension principle, and we show that our knowledge of mathematical truths is linked to our knowledge of that principle. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Mary Leng (2005). Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry? International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
Mark Balaguer (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. Synthese 103 (3):303 - 325.
Colin Cheyne (1999). Problems with Profligate Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (2):164-177.
M. Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35 - 49.
Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
Mark Balaguer (1994). Against (Maddian) Naturalized Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 2 (2):97-108.
Bernard Linsky (2005). Remarks on Platonized Naturalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):3-15.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads36 ( #33,628 of 556,840 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,428 of 556,840 )How can I increase my downloads? |

