Ontology and the concept of an object
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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When people deny that there are objects of a certain kind, they normally take this to be a reason to stop speaking as if such objects existed. For instance, when atheists deny the existence of God, they take this to be a reason to stop speaking about God’s will or His mercy. Or, to take a more mundane example, when people deny that there are round squares or that there are unicorns, they take this to be a reason to stop speaking as if rounds squares or unicorns existed.
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