Ontology and the concept of an object
| Abstract | When people deny that there are objects of a certain kind, they normally take this to be a reason to stop speaking as if such objects existed. For instance, when atheists deny the existence of God, they take this to be a reason to stop speaking about God’s will or His mercy. Or, to take a more mundane example, when people deny that there are round squares or that there are unicorns, they take this to be a reason to stop speaking as if rounds squares or unicorns existed. | |||||||||
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Bruce Milem (2007). Turner on Reason and Proving God's Existence. Philosophy and Theology 19 (1/2):79-94.
Peter Van Inwagen (1990). Material Beings. Cornell University Press.
Eli Hirsch (2010). Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Oxford University Press.
Ye Xiushan & Zhang Lin (2008). Levinas Faces Kant, Hegel and Heidegger: Debates of Contemporary Philosophy on Ontology. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (3):438 - 454.
Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
Kwame Anthony Appiah & Julian Baggini (2011). In Defence of Honour. The Philosopher's Magazine (53):22-31.
Xiushan Ye (2008). Levinas Faces Kant, Hegel and Heidegger: Debates of Contemporary Philosophy on Ontology. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (3):438-454.
Charles Crittenden (1973). Thinking About Non-Being. Inquiry 16 (1-4):290 – 312.
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