Particularism in question: An interview with Jonathan Dancy

Theoria 74 (1):3-17 (2008)
Abstract
Jonathan Dancy works within almost all fields of philosophy but is best known as the leading proponent of moral particularism. Particularism challenges “traditional” moral theories, such as Contractualism, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, in that it denies that moral thought and judgement relies upon, or is made possible by, a set of more or less well-defined, hierarchical principles. During the summer of 2006, the Philosophy Departments of Lund University (Sweden) and the University of Reading (England) began a series of exchanges to take place every other year, alternating between the departments. Andreas Lind and Johan Brännmark arranged to meet Dancy during the first meeting in Lund to talk about questions regarding particularism, moral theory and the shape of the analytical tradition. The major part of the conversation is printed below.
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References found in this work BETA
C. D. Broad (1959). Five Types of Ethical Theory. Paterson, N.J.,Littlefield, Adams.
Terence H. Irwin (2000). Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle's Ambitions for Moral Theory'. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 100--29.

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Citations of this work BETA
Johan Brännmark (2009). Goodness, Values, Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329 - 343.
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