Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):819 - 828 (1977)
Abstract
In "the meaning of 'meaning'," hilary putnam uses three "twin earth" examples to argue that natural kind terms do not have a sense. I argue that the first two only show that kind terms are like indexicals and that they are rigid designators but that this is compatible with having a sense. The third argument relies on a theory about the epistemological role of kind terms and the claim that there are no analytic truths about kinds that could arise from a sense
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 14,009
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Igor Douven & Jaap van Brakel (1998). Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):59-70.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-29

Total downloads

18 ( #134,859 of 1,696,635 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #250,122 of 1,696,635 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.