Reference by Abstraction

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):45-71 (2012)
Abstract
Frege suggests that criteria of identity should play a central role in the explanation of reference, especially to abstract objects. This paper develops a precise model of how we can come to refer to a particular kind of abstract object, namely, abstract letter types. It is argued that the resulting abstract referents are ‘metaphysically lightweight’
Keywords reference  abstract objects  criteria of identity  Frege
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