David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28 (2003)
Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: What makes knowingp better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life
|Keywords||virtues reliabilism value epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.
James Montmarquet (1993). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Rowman & Littlefield.
Ernest Sosa (2003). The Place of Truth in Epistemology. In Linda Zagzebski & Michael DePaul (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press 155-180.
Michael R. DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.) (2003). Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2013). Knowledge: Value on the Cheap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013). In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
Benjamin Jarvis (2013). Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.
Tsung‐Hsing Ho (2016). Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity. Theoria 82 (3):274–284.
Steve Petersen (2013). Utilitarian Epistemology. Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
Similar books and articles
Fabienne Peter (2008). Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55.
Georgi Gardiner (2012). Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value. Acta Analytica 27 (2):163-181.
Kai von Fintel & Sabine Iatridou (2003). Epistemic Containment. Linguistic Inquiry 34:173-98.
Linda Zagzebski (2007). Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy. Episteme 4 (3):252-263.
Berit Brogaard (2011). Primitive Knowledge Disjunctivism. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73.
David Henderson (2009). Motivated Contextualism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.
Hilary Kornblith (1993). Epistemic Normativity. Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.
Anthony T. Flood (2008). Epistemic Badness. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:253-262.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads737 ( #859 of 1,911,368 )
Recent downloads (6 months)60 ( #8,779 of 1,911,368 )
How can I increase my downloads?