Which abstraction principles are acceptable? Some limitative results

Neo-Fregean logicism attempts to base mathematics on abstraction principles. Since not all abstraction principles are acceptable, the neo-Fregeans need an account of which ones are. One of the most promising accounts is in terms of the notion of stability; roughly, that an abstraction principle is acceptable just in case it is satisfiable in all domains of sufficiently large cardinality. We present two counterexamples to stability as a sufficient condition for acceptability and argue that these counterexamples can be avoided only by major departures from the existing neo-Fregean programme
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp001
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References found in this work BETA
Agustin Rayo (1999). Toward a Theory of Second-Order Consequence. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (3):315-325.
Alan Weir (2003). Neo-Fregeanism: An Embarrassment of Riches. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (1):13-48.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. P. Studd (forthcoming). Abstraction Reconceived. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu035.

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