Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):125 – 140 (2002)
|Abstract||Moral cognitivism, internalism about moral judgements, and Humeanism about motivating reasons all possess attractions.Yet they cannot all be true.This is the so-called moral problem. Dancy offers an interesting particularist response to the moral problem. However, we argue that this response, first, provides an inadequate basis for the distinction between motivating states and states necessary for motivation although not themselves motivators; second, draws no support from considerations about weakness of the will; and third, involves an implausible account of desire.We conclude that particularism ú whatever other attractions it may have ú does not solve the moral problem.|
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