Online research in philosophy

Current professional and lay lore overlook the role of honesty in developing and sustaining intimate relationships. We wish to assert its importance. We begin by analyzing the notion of intimacy. An intimate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by regular intimate encounters or exchanges. Then, we consider two sorts of cases where it is widely thought permissible, if not laudatory, to lie to one's intimates. In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring honesty. We end by suggesting how 'meta honesty'--honesty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is Particularly important in intimate relationships.

Current professional and lay lore overlook the role of honesty in developing and sustaining intimate relationships. We wish to assert its importance. We begin by analyzing the notion of intimacy. An intimate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by regular intimate encounters or exchanges. Then, we consider two sorts of cases where it is widely thought permissible, if not laudatory, to lie to one's intimates. In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring honesty. We end by suggesting how 'meta honesty'--honesty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is Particularly important in intimate relationships.

This essay challenges those strains of contemporary social theory that regard romantic/sexual intimacy as a premier site of detraditionalization in the late modern era. Striking changes have occurred in intimacy and family life over the last half-century, but the notion of detraditionalization as currently formulated does not capture them very well. With the goal of achieving a more refined understanding, the article proposes a distinction between "regulative" and "meaning-constitutive" traditions. The former involve threats of exclusion from various moral communities; the latter involve linguistic and cultural frameworks within which sense is made of the world. Focusing on the U.S. case and marshaling various kinds of empirical evidence, the article argues that while the regulative tradition of what it terms lifelong, internally stratified marriage has declined in strength in recent years, the image of the form of couplehood inscribed in this regulative tradition continues to function as a hegemonic ideal in many American intimate relationships. Intimacy in the United States also remains beholden to the tradition of romantic love. That these meaning-constitutive traditions continue to play a central role in structuring contemporary intimacy suggests that detraditionalization involves the relative decline only of certain regulative traditions, a point that calls into question some of the normative assessments that often accompany the detraditionalization thesis.

This paper is a critique of a paper by Robert Lipkin [1]. Arguments for the following claims are put forward: (1) that what is essential to the psychiatric relationship is what we want it to be for utilitarian reasons; (2) it would not be to our advantage to allow the medicalization of morality; (3) what we should expect from the psychiatrist is prudential advice, not moral advice, and that Lipkin has a confused view about the relationship between these two areas; and (4) we should not allow the psychiatrist to restrict individuals on moral grounds, but only on public safety grounds.

Electronic communication raises challenges to our understanding of the ethics of interpersonal relationship. This paper examines one area of electronic communication, the practice of journal blogging, and its correlation to one form of interpersonal relationship, intimacy. Analyzing intimacy in terms of knowledge, esteem, and assimilation, the paper argues that while journal blogging would seem to enhance and facilitate these relational elements, the practice in fact and in principle undermines them.

Many aspects of life today are perceived as complex and perplexing, and in particular the many-faceted area of human relationships. This article argues that the ideas and visions of Carl Rogers offer a constructive and encouraging perspective which merits a re-examination and a consideration of its relevance in our contemporary world. Rogers’ work was primarily directed towards the development of his counselling and psychotherapeutic theories. However, his writings also convey a deep commitment to intimacy, genuineness and real communication in significant relationships in everyday life. Rogers’ vision of genuine relationship may be deemed idealistic and irrelevant to contemporary living; however, an examination of Rogers’ ‘core conditions’ for optimal human relating and his understanding of human flourishing reveals a courageous faith and hope in human nature. Perhaps, our present world, with its ever-expanding array of virtual connectivity and corresponding alienation, may be enriched by a careful consideration of Rogers’ insights and ideals.

The right to privacy is a moral concept that has been debated for centuries. This article traces the histo y of the concept and examines how the existence of a right to privacy has been defended by philosophers through the years. This article examines the strategies behind those arguments, showing how some of them are more convincing than others. Following this analysis is a practical argument for recognizing a universal right to privacy over intimate relationships and information. Intimacy is a part of human dipity, and revealing it does not tell much about the character of politicians, or anyone else. Intimacy deserves protection.

Our primary focus is the concept of intimacy, especially in the context of adult American male relationships. We begin with an examination of comradeship, a nonintimate form of friendship, then develop an account of the nature and value of intimacy in friendship. We follow this with discussions of obstacles to intimacy and of Aristotle's views. In the final section, we discuss the process of men attaining intimacy.

The relationship between intimacy and honesty seems a paradoxical one. While intimate relationships would seem to demand a high level of honesty, this same intimacy might make us more likely to shield the other or protect ourselves through benevolent lying or the withholding of information. It would seem that honesty may not always be the best policy in intimate relationships. The purpose of this article is to examine the tension between honesty and intimacy in Kant’s duty of friendship, and it will highlight the limitations of Kant’s expectations of friendship. At the same time I will use Kant’s own appeal to the autonomy of moral agents to delineate an appropriate role for the obligations of honesty and self disclosure in friendship.

The relationship between intimacy and honesty seems a paradoxical one. While intimate relationships would seem to demand a high level of honesty, this same intimacy might make us more likely to shield the other or protect ourselves through benevolent lying or the withholding of information. It would seem that honesty may not always be the best policy in intimate relationships. The purpose of this article is to examine the tension between honesty and intimacy in Kant’s duty of friendship, and it will highlight the limitations of Kant’s expectations of friendship. At the same time I will use Kant’s own appeal to the autonomy of moral agents to delineate an appropriate role for the obligations of honesty and self disclosure in friendship.