David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376 (2003)
Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility.
|Keywords||Compatibilism Ethics Identification Motivation Responsibility Bratman, M Frankfurt, H Watson, G|
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David Faraci & David Shoemaker (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
Michael Brownstein (forthcoming). Attributionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
Elinor Mason (2005). Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
David Shoemaker (2009). Responsibility and Disability. Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):438-461.
David Shoemaker (2013). Qualities of Will. Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):95-120.
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