Retributive parsimony

Res Publica 15 (4):377-395 (2009)
Abstract
Retributive approaches to the justification of legal punishment are often thought to place exacting and unattractive demands on state officials, requiring them to expend scarce public resources on apprehending and punishing all offenders strictly in accordance with their criminal ill deserts. Against this caricature of the theory, I argue that retributivists can urge parsimony in the use of punishment. After clarifying what parsimony consists in, I show how retributivists can urge reductions in the use of punishment in order to conserve scarce resources for other valuable social purposes, minimize the foreseeable and adverse effects of legal punishment on the innocent, and accommodate the fact that existing societies fail in numerous ways to satisfy the conditions that make retributive punishment fully justified.
Keywords Legal punishment  Retributivism  Parsimony  Sentencing
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Antony Duff (1977). Psychopathy and Moral Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):189 - 200.

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