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From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt to justify induction by means of an inductive argument must beg the question. I will consider how the inductive justification of induction fares from the reliabilist point of view. I will also consider two other wellknown arguments that can be construed as inductive assessments of induction. One is the miracle argument, according to which the truth of scientific theories should be inferred as the best explanation of their predictive success; the other is the disaster argument, according to which we should infer that all present and future theories are false on the grounds that all past theories have been found to be false
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00069
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Moti Mizrahi (2012). Why the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism Ultimately Fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):132-138.
Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.

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