David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Marina Frasca-Spada & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Impressions of Hume. Oxford University Press 59 (2005)
It was David Hume’s great sceptical argument about non-demonstrative reasoning—the problem of induction—that hooked me on philosophy. I am still wriggling, but in the present essay I will not consider how the Humean challenge to justify our inductive practices might be met; rather, I ask why we had to wait until Hume for the challenge to be raised. The question is a natural one to ask, given the intense interest in scepticism before Hume for as far back as we can see in the history of philosophy, and given that Hume’s sceptical argument is so simple and so fundamental. It is not so easy to answer. I am no historian of philosophy, and given the pull that the problem of induction exerts on my own philosophical thinking, I know there is a considerable risk that the historical speculations I consider here will turn out to be worthlessly anachronistic. But I hope not.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Steel, What If the Principle of Induction is Normative? Means-Ends Epistemology and Hume's Problem.
Wayne Waxman (1994). Hume's Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Samir Okasha (2005). Bayesianism and the Traditional Problem of Induction. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):181-194.
Michael Rowan (1993). Stove on the Rationality of Induction and the Uniformity Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):561-566.
Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall (2011). What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
Louis E. Loeb (2006). Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument About Induction. Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
Samir Okasha (2005). Does Hume's Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):253–271.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #82,339 of 1,725,162 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #93,209 of 1,725,162 )
How can I increase my downloads?