Why Sex (Offending) Is Different

Criminal Justice Ethics 30 (2):151-172 (2011)
The central premise is that a significant amount of sex offending stems from unusual or inappropriate sexual preferences that appear in early adolescence, are relatively stable, and immutable. In those ways, they are like more ordinary sexual preferences, generating sexual impulses that are insistent. Individuals are strongly tempted to act on them, alternatives to satisfying them are unfulfilling, and complete long-term control of such impulses is unlikely. Yet, since individuals with sexual preferences for inappropriate objects or activities are neither morally nor legally permitted to act on them, they find themselves in a terrific bind. The public is, to some extent, correct to not trust the individuals with such preferences and to attempt to monitor or control them. However, most such efforts appear ineffective and counterproductive. Recidivist sex offenders are particularly worrisome. The possibility of voluntary castration for such offenders, in lieu of preventive detention or other more restrictive measures, is explored
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DOI 10.1080/0731129X.2011.592679
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