David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235 (2004)
The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, they invite comparison with two established results on the aggregation of preferences: the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's impossibility theorem. We may ask whether the new impossibility theorem is a special case of Arrow's theorem, or whether there are interesting disanalogies between the two results. In this paper, we compare the two theorems, and show that they are not straightforward corollaries of each other. We further suggest that, while the framework of preference aggregation can be mapped into the framework of judgment aggregation, there exists no obvious reverse mapping. Finally, we address one particular minimal condition that is used in both theorems – an independence condition – and suggest that this condition points towards a unifying property underlying both impossibility results.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Johan van Benthem (2007). Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.
Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
Gabriella Pigozzi (2006). Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation. [REVIEW] Synthese 152 (2):285 - 298.
Fabienne Peter (2007). Rawls' Idea of Public Reason and Democratic Legitimacy. Journal of International Political Theory 3 (1):129-143.
Similar books and articles
Christian List (2012). Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction. In U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier
Christian List (2005). The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions. Social Choice and Welfare 24 (1):3-32.
Christian List & Ben Polak (2010). Introduction to Judgment Aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):441-466.
Philippe Mongin (2008). Factoring Out the Impossibility of Logical Aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory 141:p. 100-113.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Daniele Porello (2010). Ranking Judgments in Arrow's Setting. Synthese 173 (2):199 - 210.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1/2):207 - 235.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #71,304 of 1,724,952 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #64,836 of 1,724,952 )
How can I increase my downloads?