Common knowledge: Relating anti-founded situation semantics to modal logic neighbourhood semantics [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Logic, Language and Information 3 (4):285-302 (1994)
|Abstract||Two approaches for defining common knowledge coexist in the literature: the infinite iteration definition and the circular or fixed point one. In particular, an original modelization of the fixed point definition was proposed by Barwise (1989) in the context of a non-well-founded set theory and the infinite iteration approach has been technically analyzed within multi-modal epistemic logic using neighbourhood semantics by Lismont (1993). This paper exhibits a relation between these two ways of modelling common knowledge which seem at first quite different.|
|Keywords||Common knowledge multi-modal logic neighbourhood semantics non-well-founded sets Scott models|
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