David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 48 (1):156-178 (2014)
I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency and intentionality.
|Keywords||Free will determinism the ability to do otherwise compatibilism agency intentional stance modal versus conditional and dispositional analyses of abilities multi-level systems supervenience and multiple realizability nonreductive physicalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Oisín Deery (2015). Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List (2014). Two Intuitions About Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.
Larry Alexander (2014). The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example, and What It Shows: Or Why Determinism Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility. Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):141-143.
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