Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise

Noûs 48 (1):156-178 (2014)
Abstract
I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency and intentionality.
Keywords Free will  determinism  the ability to do otherwise  compatibilism  agency  intentional stance  modal versus conditional and dispositional analyses of abilities  multi-level systems  supervenience and multiple realizability  nonreductive physicalism
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12019
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