David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105 (2006)
Can groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must 'supervene' on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So, knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be 'set-wise', not 'proposition-wise'. Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious, but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members' corresponding individual judgments.
|Keywords||Agency Epistemology Group Act Proposition Rationality Supervenience|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Margaret P. Gilbert (2001). Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice. Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
Citations of this work BETA
Anne Schwenkenbecher (2013). Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations. Ratio 26 (3):310-328.
Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2007). Optimal Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):813-824.
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