David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2011)
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individuals that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should explain the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable on the model of individual agents. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, to a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper approach to the social sciences, law, morality, and politics must take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.
|Keywords||Agent (Philosophy Group identity Social choice Juristic persons|
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|Call number||B105.A35.L57 2011|
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John Sutton (2013). Skill and Collaboration in the Evolution of Human Cognition. Biological Theory 8 (1):28-36.
Sally Haslanger (forthcoming). What is a Structural Explanation? Philosophical Studies:1-18.
Jeroen de Ridder (2013). Epistemic Dependence and Collective Scientific Knowledge. Synthese 191 (1):1-17.
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