David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 2 (1):25-38 (2005)
The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the case of the discursive paradox, it is not stable with respect to the level of aggregation in the case of the Ostrogorski paradox. In the following I argue that, despite these differences, the two problems have a similar structure. My conclusion will be twofold: on the one hand, the similarities between the paradoxes support the claim that these problems should be tackled using the same aggregation procedure; on the other hand, applying the same procedure to these paradoxes will help clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the aggregation method itself. More specifically, I will show that an operator defined in artificial intelligence to merge belief bases can deal with both paradoxes
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
Alvin I. Goldman (2004). Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social Epistemology. Episteme 1 (1):11-22.
David M. Estlund (1994). Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision 36 (2):131-162.
Citations of this work BETA
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2006). Group Agency and Supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Kristina Rolin (2010). Group Justification in Science. Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder (2008). Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation. Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
Cathal O'Madagain (2012). Group Agents: Persons, Mobs, or Zombies? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):271-287.
Krist Vaesen & Wybo Houkes (2013). Modelling the Truth of Scientific Beliefs with Cultural Evolutionary Theory. Synthese (1):1-17.
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Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Christian List (2012). Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction. In U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier
Gabriella Pigozzi (2006). Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation. [REVIEW] Synthese 152 (2):285 - 298.
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