Public Justification of What? Coercion vs. Decision as Competing Frames for the Basic Principle of Justificatory Liberalism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Public Affairs Quaterly 25 (4):349-367 (2011)
Broadly speaking, the principle of public justifiability requires that the exercise of political power be justifiable to each and every person over whom that power is exercised. The idea of being justifiable to every person means being acceptable to any reasonable or otherwise qualified person , without such persons having to give up the comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine they reasonably espouse. Public justifiability thus involves a partly idealized unanimity requirement, or as I will say, a criterion of multi-perspectival acceptability. The demand for public justifiability can be specified in different ways, depending on what exactly has to be publicly justifiable, who is supposed to apply the principle, who counts as reasonable or otherwise qualified, and so on. One of these dimensions concerns the notion of acceptability. Should we care about acceptability to each reasonable perspective, based on all of the reasons that perspective accepts, or should we care about acceptability to all, based on only those reasons that all reasonable perspectives accept? This choice has been referred to by the distinction between "consensus" and "convergence." Sometimes people agree about practical conclusions but for different reasons, in which case their reasoning can be said to converge from different moral or philosophical starting points. Other times, people agree about their moral or philosophical starting points, but reach different practical conclusions, based on different beliefs about the factual context, different rankings of shared concerns, or different judgments about how to apply these concerns to specific situations
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Enzo Rossi (2013). Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls' Political Liberalism Versus Gaus' Justificatory Liberalism. Res Publica (1):1-17.
Gerald Gaus (2010). On Two Critics of Justificatory Liberalism: A Response to Wall and Lister. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):177-212.
Andrew Lister (2010). Public Justification and the Limits of State Action. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):151-175.
Gerald Gaus & Kevin Vallier (2009). The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions. Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (1-2):51-76.
Gerald Gaus (2010). Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism's Classical Tilt. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (01):233-.
Steven Wall (2010). On Justificatory Liberalism. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (2):123-149.
Gerald F. Gaus (1996). Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford University Press.
Tarek Hayfa (2004). The Idea of Public Justification in Rawls's Law of Peoples. Res Publica 10 (3):233-246.
William Glod (2010). Political Liberalism, Basic Liberties, and Legal Paternalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):177-196.
R. B. Talisse (2012). Religion, Respect and Eberle's Agapic Pacifist. Philosophy and Social Criticism 38 (3):313-325.
Gerald Gaus (2009). Recognized Rights as Devices of Public Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):111-136.
Micah Schwartzman (2012). The Ethics of Reasoning From Conjecture. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):521-544.
Fabienne Peter (2013). Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (5):598-620.
Added to index2012-10-11
Total downloads19 ( #135,870 of 1,699,689 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #206,271 of 1,699,689 )
How can I increase my downloads?