Strong completeness theorems for weak logics of common belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):115-137 (2003)
We show that several logics of common belief and common knowledge are not only complete, but also strongly complete, hence compact. These logics involve a weakened monotonicity axiom, and no other restriction on individual belief. The semantics is of the ordinary fixed-point type
Keywords common belief  common knowledge  logical omniscience  strong completeness
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DOI 10.1023/A:1023032105687
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