The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review

Synthese 187 (1):179-207 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers new to the field of judgment aggregation a sense of this rapidly growing research area.

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Christian List
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.

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Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.

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