David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Max <span class='Hi'>Albert</span> (2003) has recently argued that the theory of power indices “should not ... be considered as part of political science” and that “[v]iewed as a scientific theory, it is a branch of probability theory and can safely be ignored by political scientists”. <span class='Hi'>Albert</span>’s argument rests on a particular claim concerning the theoretical status of power indices, namely that the theory of power indices is not a positive theory, i.e. not one that has falsifiable implications. I re-examine the theoretical status of power indices and argue that it would be unwise for political scientists to ignore such indices. Although I agree with <span class='Hi'>Albert</span> that the theory of power indices is not a positive theory, I suggest that it is a theory of measurement that can usefully supplement other positive and normative socialscientific theories.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert Batterman (1992). Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:50 - 65.
H. E. Baber (1987). How Bad Is Rape? Hypatia 2 (2):125 - 138.
Peter J. Lewis (2009). Probability, Self‐Location, and Quantum Branching. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):1009-1019.
P. X. Monaghan (2010). A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms. Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
Dale Hample, Bing Han & David Payne (2010). The Aggressiveness of Playful Arguments. Argumentation 24 (4):405-421.
Added to index2010-07-25
Total downloads6 ( #218,223 of 1,140,380 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #140,193 of 1,140,380 )
How can I increase my downloads?