David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press (2014)
Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” inconsistencies in an agent’s beliefs while permitting less blatant ones, and show that, while super-majoritarian deference often fails to ensure full consistency, it is a route to consistency in this weaker sense.
|Keywords||Social epistemology Testimony Majority deference Supermajority deference Judgment aggregation K-consistency Blatant inconsistency|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Local Supermajorities. Erkenntnis:1-16.
Fabrizio Cariani (2013). Aggregating with Reason. Synthese 190 (15):3123-3147.
Similar books and articles
Aaron Meskin (2004). Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn From Others About Beauty and Art? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):65–91.
Duncan Pritchard (2004). The Epistemology of Testimony. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
Matthew Carl Weiner (2003). Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Richard Moran (2005). Problems of Sincerity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):341–361.
Steven L. Reynolds (2002). Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
P. Faulkner (2002). On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony. Synthese 131 (3):353 - 370.
Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
Jennifer Lackey (2006). The Nature of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.
Joel Buenting (2005). Re-Thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony. Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology 2 (2):43-48.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads149 ( #14,979 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)124 ( #5,863 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?