David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619 (2011)
Lewis thought concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s just a cleverly disguised mule’) caused serious trouble for fallibilists. As he saw it, CKAs are overt statements of the fallibilist view and they are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that their pragmatic response to Lewis fails, but the fallibilist cause is not lost because Lewis was wrong about the commitments of fallibilism. There are problems with Dougherty and Rysiew’s response to Stanley and there are problems with Stanley’s response to Lewis. I’ll offer a defense of fallibilism of my own and show that fallibilists needn’t worry about CKAs.
|Keywords||Fallibilism Concessive Knowledge Attributions Epistemic Modals|
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Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Matt Lutz (2013). The Pragmatics of Pragmatic Encroachment. Synthese 191 (8):1-24.
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