Evidence and Knowledge

Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262 (2011)
Abstract
According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more radically from E = K
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References found in this work BETA
Juan Comesaña & Holly Kantin (2010). Is Evidence Knowledge? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447 - 454.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2008). Evidence. In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alexander Arnold (2013). Some Evidence is False. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
Nick Hughes (2014). Consistency and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.
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