David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262 (2011)
According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more radically from E = K
|Keywords||Philosophy Logic Ethics Ontology Epistemology Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Earl Conee & Richard Feldman (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Bob Beddor (2015). Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
Alexander Arnold (2013). Some Evidence is False. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.
Alfred Schramm (2014). Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue. Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591.
Nick Hughes (2014). Consistency and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.
Similar books and articles
Clayton Littlejohn (2013). No Evidence is False. Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
Timothy Williamson (1997). Knowledge as Evidence. Mind 106 (424):1-25.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Armchair Access. Synthese 179 (3):479 - 500.
Aaron Rizzieri (2009). Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.
Andrew Moon (2012). Knowing Without Evidence. Mind 121 (482):309-331.
Simon A. Cole, Toward Evidence-Based Evidence: Supporting Forensic Knowledge Claims in the Post-Daubert Era.
Brian Weatherson (2014). Probability and Scepticism. In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press 71-86.
Sherrilyn Roush (2005). Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford University Press.
Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
Michael J. Shaffer (2013). E Does Not Equal K. The Reasoner 7:30-31.
Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
Added to index2010-10-17
Total downloads214 ( #14,956 of 1,939,061 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #37,463 of 1,939,061 )
How can I increase my downloads?