Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Skepticism

In Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism (2011)
Abstract
In this paper, I defend a non-skeptical intuitionist approach to moral epistemology from recent criticisms. Starting with Sinnott-Armstrong's skeptical attacks, I argue that a familiar sort of skeptical argument rests on a problematic conception of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments. The success of his argument turns on whether we conceive of the evidential grounds of our moral judgments as consisting entirely of non-normative considerations. While we cannot avoid skepticism if we accept this conception of our evidential grounds, that's because accepting this conception of our evidential grounds is tantamount to accepting the skeptic's conclusion. We have nothing to fear from arguments for skepticism from skepticism.
Keywords Ethical Intuitionism  Foundationalism  Moral Skepticism  Moral Epistemology  Evidence
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