David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14 (2012)
Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently probable belief. If we reject the idea that justified beliefs can be characterized as sufficiently probably beliefs, Kroedel’s solution is otiose because the paradox can be dissolved at the outset.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2014). Justification is Potential Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.
Anna-Maria A. Eder (2015). No Match Point for the Permissibility Account. Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.
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