Moore's paradox and epistemic norms

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100 (2010)
Abstract
We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief
Keywords Epistemic Norms  Epistemic Justification  Moore's Paradox  Knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.
Alexander Bird (2007). Justified Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81-110.

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