Must we act only on what we know?

Journal of Philosophy 106 (8):463-473 (2009)
What relation is there between knowledge and action? According to Hawthorne and Stanley, where your choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p (RKP). In this paper, I shall argue that it is permissible to treat something as a reason for action even if it isn't known to be true and address Hawthorne and Stanley's arguments for RKP.
Keywords Knowledge  Action  Reasons for Action
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2009106841
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PhilPapers Archive Clayton Littlejohn, Must we act only on what we know?
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Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (2012). Knowledge Norms and Acting Well. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.
Dustin Locke (2015). Practical Certainty. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.

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