‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):363-73 (2009)
Some recent defenses of the 'ought' implies 'can' (OIC) principle try to derive that principle from uncontroversial claims about reasons for action. Reasons for action, it's said, are reasons only for 'potential' actions, which are actions that an agent can perform. Given that 'ought' implies 'reasons', it seems we have our proof of OIC. In this paper, I argue that this latest strategy for defending OIC fails.
Keywords Practical Reasons
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PhilPapers Archive Clayton Littlejohn, ‘Ought’, ‘Can’, and Practical Reasons
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