An All-inclusive Interpretation of Aristotle's Contemplative Life

Sophia 50 (1):57-71 (2011)
The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is correct, the inclusive and dominant interpretations will converge, for the philosopher turns out to be the happiest human being both in the inclusive and dominant senses
Keywords Aristotle  Nicomachean Ethics  Happiness (eudaimonia)  Contemplation (theōria)  Wisdom (sophia)  Prudence (phronēsis)  All-inclusive interpretation
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DOI 10.1007/s11841-010-0203-7
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Stephen Clark & R. Kraut (1993). Aristotle on the Human Good. Journal of Hellenic Studies 113 (3):193.

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Roopen Majithia (2005). On the Eudemian and Nicomachean Conceptions of Eudaimonia. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):365-388.

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