David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Our discussion in the first five sections shows that little new can be said about compatibilism, that van Inwagen's argument for incompatibilism still stands, and that the view of free agency for a libertarian has little chance unless she believes that agency contains elements that are not within the natural order. Borrowing from a suggestion from Russell we expanded the Nozick-Kane model of libertarian free agency and connected it to the Wignerian interpretation of quantum measurement. As such, free decisions and choices may well violate the Born rule of probability distribution and yet it is shown how such violations are unlikely to be detected in experiments. This model is probably the only model in which Loewer's van Inwagen style argument for the incompatibility between free agency and quantum indeterminism does not apply, and it is a model in which free agency is not only compatible but necessary. It is compatible with indeterminism and it is necessary for the determinateness of any measurement outcomes.
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