The implication of Rawls' approach to public reason

Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (1):161-169 (2011)
Abstract
Rawls’ appealing to free agreement in the original position cannot be understood as the source of real commitment to principles of social justice. According to the contextualistic interpretation, to establish and clarify the reasonableness of one context, one needs to appeal to the reasonableness of some higher-order contexts. Because the two meta-contexts of global basic structure and domestic basic structure can be seen as higher-order or lower-order context relative to each, depending on concrete cases, by excluding the consideration of global situation that must have effects on the realization of domestic justice, justice as fairness is blind both to the global context of domestic justice and to the domestic context of global justice.
Keywords Rawls  Contextualism  Justification  Global
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,365
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1999). Collected Papers. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (1993). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Joseph Heath (2005). Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (sup1):193-226.
Dong Jin Jang (2008). Rawls and Natural Justice. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 29:31-43.
Leif Wenar (2004). The Unity of Rawls’s Work. Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (3):265-275.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-02-13

Total downloads

14 ( #115,725 of 1,102,744 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #61,837 of 1,102,744 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.