Journal for General Philosophy of Science 39 (2):383 - 394 (2008)
|Abstract||The basic principles of dispositional essentialism do not require that the fundamental spatiotemporal relations are dispositional in nature. Nevertheless, Bird (who defends dispositional monism) argues that they possess dispositional essences in virtue of the fact that the obtaining of these relations can be characterised by the satisfaction of a certain counterfactual. In this paper I argue that his suggestion fails, and so, despite his attempt, the case of the spatiotemporal relations remains the ‘big bad bug’ for the thesis of dispositional monism.|
|Keywords||Background independence Conditional analysis Dispositional monism Spatiotemporal relations A. Bird|
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