David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Investigations 27 (1):34–67 (2004)
Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege’s idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any proposition: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs. But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use. (Blue Book, p.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dover Publications.
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958). The Blue and Brown Books. Harper and Row.
Citations of this work BETA
Maria Balaska (2014). The Notion of Happiness in Early Wittgenstein: Towards a Non-Contentful Account of Happiness. South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):407-415.
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